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It is a great honor for me to give the Cuhel Memorial Lecture at the Prague Conference 
on Political Economy for 2011.  Franz Cuhel rightly holds an honored place in the 
development of the pure theory of the Austrian school of economics.1 Ludwig von Mises 
credits Cuhel (1907) with providing the first presentation of a strict ordinal marginal 
utility analysis.  The confusion in choice theory that eventually lead to the purging of the 
human element in the economic analysis of decision making would have been avoided 
had Cuhel’s ordinal presentation of marginal utility analysis been more widely accepted.  
Instead, it was for Mises (1949) and later Rothbard (1962b) to develop that presentation 
and offer it as an alternative to the neoclassical theory of microeconomics that developed 
after John Hicks’ (1939) Value and Capital. 
The implications, I would argue, are far greater than the technical issues of 
ordinal versus cardinal utility and the subsequent debate among ordinal utility theorists of 
marginal utility analysis and demonstrated preference versus marginal rates of 
substitution and indifference curve analysis, etc.  The implications of the debate in choice 
theory go to core of how we view the individual that we study in economics.2  The 
                                                
† University Professor of Economics at George Mason University, and BB&T Professor for the Study of 
Capitalism at the Mercatus Center.  I would like to thank Chris Coyne, Pete Leeson, Josef Sima, and Ed 
Stringham for useful comments on an earlier draft, and David Hebert and Nick Snow for research 
assistance in preparing the paper. 
1 See Hudik (2007) for an overview of Cuhel’s life and work. 
2 Focus should be on the substantive economics of the human chooser in Mises’s first part of Human 
Action (1949) rather than his philosophical defense of methodological dualism and the apriori nature of 
economic theory.  More recently, Richard Wagner (2010, 1-26) discusses the differences between ‘closed 
maximization’ versus ‘open action’ for economic analysis and social sciences more generally more 
cogently to my mind than any other contemporary example. 
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optimizing agent who must maximize against given constraints belongs to the world of 
Hicks, but the human actor who is fallible yet capable, who must balance between 
alluring hopes and haunting fears, belongs to the world of Cuhel and Mises.  “Choice” 
theory in the Hicksian presentation is close-ended, I would argue, while choice in the 
Misesian framework is open-ended.  The implications of this go not only to the way we 
conceive of the individual in economic analysis, but ultimately determines our analysis of 
the impact that the diversity of institutions within which men act will have on their acts of 
choice, their exchange relationships, and their ability to realize the gains from trade, and 
the gains from innovation.   
Adam Smith long ago taught us that man has a natural propensity to truck, barter 
and exchange, and Thomas Hobbes also warned us of man’s propensity to rape, pillage 
and plunder.  Which human propensity dominates any social environment is a function of 
the institutions in place that provide the rewards and penalties in social intercourse.  But 
this institutional analysis requires that our model of the act of individual choice in 
economics is logical (predictably rational), yet indeterminate in manifestation.  In other 
words, what is “rational” is contextual in nature, and not acontextual, or to use the 
language of Vernon Smith (2007), rationality in economics should be conceived of as 
ecological and not constructivist. 
The open-endedness of human action can be captured in the ordinal analysis laid 
out by Cuhel (1907) and developed by Mises (1949), whereas the closed and robotic 
agent fits with the analysis of decision-making provided by Hicks and the subsequent 
developments of neo-classical price theory. And, as the German sociologist Hans Albert 
(1979; 2010) acutely argued long ago, the institutional deficiency that was evident in 
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1950-1970 neoclassical economics would never be completely repaired until the 
behavioral foundations of neoclassical economics are changed.3  The maximizing actor 
model cannot accommodate institutional analysis without diluting it to the point of non-
existence.4  Instead, we need to engage in rational choice analysis as if the choosers were 
human actors, and this enables us to do institutional analysis as if history and culture 
mattered.  In short, only by moving away from the economics of automatons and the twin 
obsessions of optimizing and equilibrium, and instead focus on the economics of human 
actors with a focus on perception of opportunity and processes of adjustment to change 
can we see how the institutional context of choice not only structures incentives, but 
shapes the choice context faced by the individual. 
 While Cuhel’s work was a contribution to positive economic theory, I want to 
argue that this approach to the logic of human action provides the foundation for 
subsequent developments in comparative political economy that addressed questions in 
institutional analysis.  Thus, my title – “Austrian Economics and Anarchism.”   
This title is meant to be startling at first sight.  Adherents of the Austrian school 
of economics claim their work to be a scientific body of thought, and not a normative 
                                                
3 It is important to stress that a goal of neoclassical economists in this period was to develop an 
‘institutionally antiseptic’ theory, and this lead to the counter-reaction of what latter was termed “New 
Institutionalism” in economics --- e.g., property rights, law and economics, public choice, ‘new’ economic 
history, etc.  See the discussion of this counter-reactions in economics and also his discussion of ‘new’ 
versus ‘neo’ institutionalism in Eggertsson’s Economic Behavior and Institutions (1990). 
4 An important illustration of this point is the development of the theory of market socialism by Oskar 
Lange (1936) and Abba Lerner (1944); though also see Lavoie (1985).  They both argued that in the realm 
of pure theory what they had demonstrated was that the model of market socialism could mimic the 
efficiency results of the model of capitalism, but that in practice the model of market socialism would 
outperform the model of capitalism because they could eliminate the real-world problems of capitalism 
associated with monopoly, externalities, and business cycles.  The point I want to emphasis is the pure 
theory point --- in the model the institutional differences between socialism and capitalism were completely 
neutralized.  Lange went as far in his essay to accuse Mises of “institutionalism” because he thought 
economic calculation depending on private property.  And, in Milton Friedman’s (1947) review essay on 
Lerner’s The Economics of Control he stressed that it was a mistake for economists to engage in public 
policy analysis as if administration were done inside of an institutional vacuum. 
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political doctrine.  Correctly so, I agree.  And clearly anarchism is an extreme and even 
romantic political doctrine as far removed from science in the public imagination as is 
possible.  How can the two be put in the same title?5   
But it is also true that for the audience to which I am addressing, perhaps my title 
is not startling at all, but in fact commonplace. The sophisticated audience here at the 
Prague Conference in Political Economy is no doubt familiar with the radical libertarian 
writings of Murray Rothbard (1970, 1973, 1982) and those who follow Rothbard such as 
Walter Block (1976) or Hans Herman Hoppe (2001).  Rothbard, Block and Hoppe are 
foremost representatives of the individualistic and anarcho-capitalist camp of normative 
political economy, and they also are self-styled Austrian economists.  Whatever my 
criticisms, or sympathies, are with the Rothbardian approach, that is decidedly not what I 
intend to discuss here.  My intent to startle remains.  Rather than discuss the normative 
political theory doctrine of anarcho-capitalism, my focus is on the positive political 
economy of anarchism and its relationship to the positive economic theory of the Austrian 
school of economics.  In the end I hope to persuade my intended audience that the study 
of anarchism is part of a progressive research program in contemporary Austrian 
economics.6   
The right way to view this paper is as an invitation to inquiry into situations 
where “alternative institutions that support economic activity when a government is 
                                                
5 One easy way to square this is to emphasize the Schumpeterian point about the necessity of pre-analytic 
cognitive acts (what he called ‘vision’ and what others might call ‘ideology’) for the analytic cognitive acts 
that are the domain of positive science (what he called ‘analysis’).  So an anarchist vision would lead one to 
engage in analysis differently than an alternative vision, but the positive science concerning the analysis 
can be judged independently from one’s assessment of the vision.  I appreciate this point, but that is not the 
way I am going to pursue my argument. 
6 See my essay “Anarchism as a Progressive Research Program in Political Economy” (Boettke 2005). 
Also see the comprehensive survey of the literature by Powell and Stringham (2009). 
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unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection of property rights and enforcement of 
contracts through the machinery of state laws.” (Dixit 2004, vii)  It is an effort to 
persuade students of Austrian economics, that embracing an empirically oriented research 
program focusing on the institutional analysis of situations of self-governance is not only 
an exciting intellectual endeavor, but perhaps the best way to advance the theoretical and 
methodological tradition of the Austrian school of economics in the context of modern 
scientific economics. 
 By the positive political economy of anarchism I mean simply the study of 
historical and contemporary situations where the rules (and their enforcement) that 
govern social intercourse are not provided, for whatever reason, by a geographic 
monopoly supplier of law and order.  And I am particular interested in those social 
relations that concern the recognition of property rights, the keeping of promises, and the 
transference of goods and service through consent.  In standard economic analysis the 
institutions within which economic activity takes places are treated as given.  The rules of 
the game and their enforcement are exogenously provided and constitute the social 
framework within which individuals engage in economic activity.  The positive political 
economy of anarchism does not accept this assumption of exogenously provided 
institutions.  Instead, the research program we are describing focuses on endogenous rule 
formation.7   
                                                
7 James Buchanan (2011) has recently argued again that endogenous rule formation cannot be trusted 
precisely because there is no analogous profit-loss mechanism in operation in the selection of the 
framework of rules.  This position of Buchanan’s is not new, and Israel Kirzner (2000) also shares 
Buchanan’s skepticism.  Though more controversial of an interpretation, but I would argue that Rothbard 
also would argue that a spontaneous order analysis of the framework was intellectually flawed and that a 
more exogenous analysis of the framework would be required. (see, e.g., Rothbard 1962a) For Buchanan, 
the framework results from a pre-constitutional process of rational discourse that results in agreement on 
the rules, whereas to Kirzner and Rothbard the framework is provided by moral discourse over individual 
rights and commonly accepted social mores. 
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II. The Soviet and Post-Soviet Context of Trading Outside of the Law 
As a matter of empirical reality, there are plenty of exchange relationships that take place 
in an environment where the rules of the game are in fact still up for question, and 
certainly not enforced by any legitimated geographic monopoly of coercion.  The current 
market for illegal drugs in the US is one such environment, just as the market for alcohol 
during the era of Prohibition, but one could also describe the anonymous dealings on the 
internet involving perfectly legal commodities as transacted on sites from E-Bay to 
Craigslist in this manner as well.8 
 My interest in endogenous rule formation environments actually began with my 
studies of the Soviet economy.  My Austrian school perspective had alerted me to the fact 
that Soviet central planning could not have been the operating principle for the economy 
due to the Mises-Hayek critique of socialism.9  The disjoint between how the system was 
supposed to work, and how it really worked became a major theme of my work (e.g., 
Boettke 1993, chapters 3-4) --- and I wasn’t alone as this was assessment was shared by 
many economists, political scientists, and historians who studied the Soviet system up 
close and personal.  But those who approached the system from afar, tended to obscure 
the operating principles of Soviet political economy both inside the official planning 
system and outside that system in the different “colored markets” that ranged from extra-
planning system that enabled state enterprises to meet planned production targets to the 
underground market in consumer goods that provided some answer to consumer 
frustrations.   
                                                
8 One recent estimate put the magnitude of organized criminal activity at 15% of world output. 
9 See my essay on “Coase, Communism, and the ‘Black Box’ of the Soviet-Type Firm,” in Steven 
Medema, ed. (1998). 
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In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as Sovietologists gained access to the system 
that they had been denied since the ascendancy of Stalin observed that the Soviet 
planning system didn’t work according to known models of optimal planning, but instead 
through a hodgepodge of exchange relations and make work alternative supply chains in 
production.10  The social glue that held the system together was not the rational plans of 
Soviet managers, but the system of privileges and side-payments that emerged to 
coordinate the economic behavior of bureaucrats, managers, and ordinary citizens.  ‘Blat’ 
is higher than Stalin, was a common phrase used to explain how the informal economic 
system held together.  These informal arrangements were neither defined nor enforced by 
any central authority of law and order, but through a variety of private mechanisms of 
social cooperation. 
 Identifying these private mechanisms and the de facto property rights and the 
stream of rents they produced was vital for the analysis of the post-communist transition.  
And, obviously the standard assumptions of given clearly defined and strictly enforced 
property rights by the state does not apply. The state capacity to define and enforce 
property rights and freedom of contract was what was being developed.  But economic 
life couldn’t wait until that state capacity was in place.  There is, in short, an endogenous 
rules formation process that we have to recognize and study.  There is ordered anarchy 
both in terms of market theory and the price system and the framework within which the 
market process guided through relative prices is played out. 
                                                
10 The consequences of the Soviet system being effectively closed off after this period of “thaw” were dire 
for economic analysis, and steered economic research from the mid-1960s away from this “on the ground” 
approach to either escape theoretically into mathematical modeling of planning, or empirically into efforts 
to reassess the economic growth figures Soviet statistical agencies reported.  Only during the 1980s did 
economists start to get back to the economic analysis of the organizational logic of the Soviet system.  See 
Boettke (1990, 1993, 2001). 
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 The political economy of this ordered anarchy is not just evident in Soviet and 
post-Soviet example.  In fact, the ordered anarchy of everyday life exists throughout 
history and across cultures.  The way I have put the issue so far given the exclusive 
Soviet context, is in fact overly pessimistic.11   If you read carefully, it will appear as if I 
am arguing that the informal arrangements are what exists in the Soviet and post-Soviet 
environment, but everyone would be better off if we could get the state capacity to define 
and enforce property rights.  We only rely on the informal because we cannot yet rely on 
the formal.12  But the day we get formal mechanisms in place, the better off everyone will 
be.  This reading of my argument would be wrong.  Informal institutions not only serve as 
the basis of social order, and ultimately constrain the legitimacy of the formal institutions 
that the state attempts to impose on the population in question, but they can in many 
circumstances simply outperform any conceivable set of formal institutions that will 
emerge in the future given the realities of the situation and the range of possible types of 
government that would be introduced. 
 Chinese entrepreneurs, for example, have found the informal institutions to be 
more secure and thus have made long term investments.  The situation is different in 
Russia even though they apparently have formal laws that should provide such security, 
                                                
11 In my analysis of Soviet and post-Soviet life I have emphasized the mechanisms that result due to the 
“black market” nature of the economy and have emphasized the dark side of the “connection based” 
economy as opposed to the “contract based” economy.  As I have often stressed, if the market economy can 
be characterized as the “strength of weak ties”, the Soviet type economy can be characterized as the 
“weakness of strong ties” – to flip a result from economic sociology.  Thus, the mechanism that I focused 
on in dealing with the Soviet black market dealings were repeat dealings among actors who relied on 
family ties and with recourse to extra-legal enforcement.  And the work tended to focus on how the post-
communist extra-legal enforcement agents emerged from the communist era extra-legal enforcement agents 
who had ties to the party.  
12 Though I would argue that a challenge for researchers in the positive political economy of anarchism 
must confront is the difference between “emergence” and “development”.  There are plenty of examples of 
how institutions have emerged historically to enable complex contractual relationships to be realized (see, 
e.g., the work by Stringham (2003) on the rise of stock exchanges) but the historical reality is that the 
formal apparatus of state law and order did follow and lead to the greater development of these institutions.  
So is there an objective limit to “anarchy” or can do we see “anarchy unbound”? 
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but there remains a lack of trust (see Rodrik, et. al., 2004).  Claudia Williamson (2009) 
has found that the informal institutions that are in operation in any society are a greater 
determinant of economic performance than the formal institutions of governance.  
“Good” informal will work to minimize the negative influence of “bad” formal 
institutions, and will work to reinforce the positive influence of “good” formal 
institutions.  She concludes that yes, institutions rule, but it is informal institutions that 
really rule.  And Leeson and Williamson (2009) argue that in the situations of transition 
economies (post-communism), less developed economies (e.g., Africa and Latin 
America), and failed and weak states (e.g., Middle East and Africa) realism is needed, not 
romance.  Governments equipped with power to protect private property have to be 
constrained in order to prevent government members from abusing their power to predate 
on citizens.  In countries where governments are not effectively constrained, government 
activity tends to favor members of the ruling elite, making increases in government 
involvement undesirable from the perspective of economic development.  The informal 
sector in such instances is not only more attractive to individuals in that situation but 
from the perspective of a realistic political economy would be more productive. 
 That observation demonstrates the contemporary relevance of recognizing the 
possibility that escaping from government might be more desirable than living under 
government. (see, e.g., Scott 2009)  But we have to move the analysis from “what 
happened” and “why it happens” ultimately to “how it happens.”  How does this system 
of informal institutions work so that individuals can coordinate their plans, realize the 
gains from trade, and realize the gains from innovation?  And can it? 
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 My example of the samizdat economy during the Soviet Union enabled 
individuals to alleviate consumer frustrations in the black-market for commodities, and it 
allowed managers of Soviet firms to meet the targets of planning authorities by relying on 
the extra-plan process of bartering and swapping of resources among state firms through 
intermediaries.  But what it didn’t do was allow the Soviet economy to realize the gains 
from social cooperation under the division of labor.  As a result, while life muddled 
through in a way that it could not have had they not had recourse to the informal sector, 
the sort of economic growth that characterizes a vibrant society eluded the population.  
Just as the samizdat intellectual culture gave some relief from oppressive tyranny while 
not overcoming it, the samizdat economic life did not permit individuals to escape the 
economic depravation of the Soviet system. 
 The real question in the post-communist situation was whether or not the samizdat 
political and economic life of the communist era could serve as the basis for the rise of a 
working democracy and vibrant market economy.13  It turned out that the idea that all that 
was needed was the development of the formal institutional capacity of the state to define 
and enforce property rights proved to be naïve for the very reasons identified by Leeson 
and Williamson (2009).  But the movement from a low income country to a middle 
income country and from a middle income country to a high income country does require 
the endogenous evolution of rules of property and contract that takes time.14  We learn 
this not only from close study of the transitioning and developing economies, but also 
from a study of the development of Western civilization.  There is a process of two-tiered 
entrepreneurship that is in operation during the development process.  Development does 
                                                
13 See Boettke (1993, chapter 7). 
14 On the process of economic development see Bauer’s From Subsistence to Exchange (2004). 
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follow from individuals realizing the gains from trade, and realizing the gains from 
innovation through entrepreneurial action, but there is also the entrepreneurial act of rule-
creation and enforcement that individuals within social settings must engage in if those 
gains from social cooperation under the division of labor are to be realized. (see Leeson 
and Boettke 2009) 
 
III. Rules, Strangers and Living Better Together 
What must those rules do if they are to accomplish the goal of realizing the gains from 
social cooperation under the division of labor, and since access to a central enforcer is 
denied in these situations how do these rules operate as self-enforcing?  That is the 
fundamental question all researchers on endogenous rules must address.  Rules that are 
not respected aren’t effective rules; they remain only notional rules.  On the other hand, 
rules that require extremely costly methods of enforcement will not on net be beneficial 
as they will give by necessity increasing scope for predatory behavior.15  In order to 
realize the gains from social cooperation, rules must simultaneously limit predation and 
maximize the opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange. 
 Such rules govern the use of resources and our social interactions with one 
another.  Hume recognized that the fundamental institutions of social order were 
property, contract and consent.  We must delineate “mine and thine”, we must keep 
promises, and we must respect transference of property by consensual trade.  So at the 
most basic level, the rules that govern property, contract and consent must become 
established.  At the next level, we must recognize that in an endogenous rule formation 
                                                
15 As Spinoza wrote, “He who tries to determine everything by law, will foment crime rather than lessen 
it.”  The work of Chris Coyne on the post-war efforts of reconstruction addresses this issue in detail, see 
Coyne (2007). 
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process that we can distinguish between form and function in rules.  The vast diversity of 
human institutions we find across cultures and through time does not mean that the gains 
from social cooperation under the division of labor can be realized under any conceivable 
set of rules.  The rules might take on the form that is culturally specific, but the function 
they serve is more universally recognizable: they must limit access to scarce resources, 
they must make individual decision makers accountable for their use of that resource, and 
they must introduce graduated penalties for those that violate the first two.  In Elinor 
Ostrom’s various studies of common-pool resources, this is what she has discovered.16  
And we see the universal character of these functions when we study covenants with and 
without swords in the field as well as in the lab (see Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 1992).  
Ostrom’s work challenges the Hobbesian presumption that covenants without the sword 
are but mere words and thus cannot serve as the basis of a secure social order.  She finds 
in a variety of circumstances instead what I have called a Smithian solution to a 
Hobbesian problem (see Boettke 2009, also see Boettke 2010).  We can observe that 
human beings have a tremendous capacity for self-governance even in situations where 
we might least expect it to be viable. 
 But observation is not analysis; it demands analysis.  In short, institutional 
analysis must move to a third stage of analysis I would argue which focuses on 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.  Standard theory suggests that self-governance is 
capable in the limited environment of small groups of homogenous agents who possess 
low discount rates.  But such environment cannot realize the great gains of social 
cooperation under the division of labor.  The cooperation in anonymity that is exhibited 
                                                
16 For an overview of the research program of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and what is called the 
Bloomington School of Institutional Analysis see Aligica and Boettke (2009). 
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in the vast division of labor is among such a large group that the number of exchanges, 
Adam Smith argued, far exceeds our computation.  In fact, the puzzle as Smith put it in 
The Wealth of Nations (1776, 18) is that while we stand in need of the cooperation of a 
great multitude of individuals in order to survive, we have the ability to make but a few 
close friends in our lifetime.  Thus, we cannot rely on benevolence alone for our survival.  
We must, and do, rely on the elicitation of cooperation through appealing to self-interest.  
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the baker or the brewer that we get our 
dinner, but from their self-interest.  But again it is not self-interest alone, it is instead the 
marshaling of self-interest via the institutions of property, contract and consent that 
coordinates the production plans of some with the consumption demands of others.  And 
this cooperation and coordination takes places among anonymous strangers and who are 
often geographically and socially distant from the market transaction and the people who 
are striking the deal. 
 Adam Smith gave us the puzzle that as economists we must solve.  We often 
forgot it was a puzzle because we take it for granted since we come to it not as an 
unknown but amazingly familiar with the situation. Too familiar, I would argue.17  Smith 
invites us to be amazed at what we immediately observe everyday.  We need to permit 
ourselves to see the mystery in the mundane.  Smith (1776, 15-16) asked us to 
contemplate the complexity of the exchange relationships required to produce a simple 
woolen coat, and Milton Friedman (borrowing from Leonard Read) held up a pencil and 
asked his audience to contemplate the same thing as the cover to his Free to Choose 
                                                
17 This, I would argue, is one of the reasons economists were complacent in dealing with the “pretense of 
knowledge” and the “fatal conceit” that Hayek identified throughout his career.  As Hayek said “The 
curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they know about what they imagine they can 
design.” (1988) 
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(1980).  I ask you today to engage in that same thought experiment on your shoes, your 
backpack, or your computer.  How many exchange relationships are required for you to 
enjoy the products that you take for granted?  And how is it that the people involved in 
this set of complex relationships come to trust one another even though they have never 
met, never spoken, and most likely will never meet. The institutions of property, prices 
and profit/loss work to facilitate trust where personal relationships are non-existent. 
 This “ordered anarchy” of the market is recognized by almost all practicing 
economists, at least at some level.  Still the 18th and 19th century doctrine of laissez faire 
has sometimes been described by critics as “anarchy with a constable” and the focus of 
much of 20th century economics was intended to demonstrate the shortcomings of the 
“ordered anarchy” of the market.  Instead of self-regulation, state regulation was required 
for economic arrangements to be efficiently organized.  Complicated contractual 
relationships required law and order, and could not develop based on profit and loss 
alone.  I cannot adequately address this argument here, but in the narrative of economic 
theory and applied political economy that I am constructing the mainstream of 20th 
century economics is overly pessimistic about “ordered anarchy” and overly optimistic 
about “reasonable regulation”. 
 
IV.  A Plea for Mechanism in the Study of Anarchy 
As mentioned above mankind has exhibited throughout history two overwhelming 
propensities: (a) a propensity to truck, barter and exchange; and (b) a propensity to rape, 
pillage and plunder.  Which propensity is manifested in history is a function of the 
institutions that men find themselves interacting with one another within.  And at their 
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core these institutions are about property, contract and consent.  The social games based 
on realizing the mutual gains from trade, are radically different from the social games 
based on predation.  When property is not respected, when there is no expectation of 
promises being kept, and consent is not required, then predatory relationships will 
dominate the social game.  On the other hand, if property is respected, promises are kept, 
and consent is required, then mutual beneficial exchange relationships will dominate the 
social game.  Predatory societies are poor and sick, exchange based societies are healthy 
and wealthy. 
 But the critical question is the mechanism of self-enforcement that permits this 
exchange-based order to develop.  And as mentioned above, to realize the great gains 
from social cooperation under the division of labor these mechanisms must work among 
anonymous actors characterized by great geographic and social distance.  But the 
working capacity for standard mechanisms of self-governance, such as reputation, are 
pushed to the limit as geographic and social distance rises.  Think of the puzzle this way, 
we have the most to gain in exchange from those that are most distant from us, yet 
precisely because of that distance we have the least reason to trust them.  Strangers are 
both potentially our greatest teachers, and our worst fear. 
 To ensure our relationships with strangers are mutually beneficial, the 
mechanisms of self-governance must be transformed to take into account the changing 
social situation.  Or to put it another way, either we must find mechanisms that transform 
the situation with strangers into a situation of in-group social intercourse, or we must 
have in operation mechanisms that build trust in institutions that permit cooperation 
among strangers.  In short, we have to identify historically the mechanisms that excluded 
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actors who could threaten the social order, and the mechanism that include those actors 
who could improve the social order through mutual beneficial exchange.  
 Among modern Austrian economists, the two economists who have done more on 
the examination of the mechanisms that make ordered anarchy possible are Edward 
Stringham and Peter Leeson.  Both take seriously the standard game-theoretic result that 
social cooperation without a geographic monopolist in law and order can only occur in 
small group settings with homogeneous agents who have low discount rates.  Their work, 
however, respectively demonstrates that this standard theoretical result is defied 
repeatedly throughout history and in fact in everyday life in the contemporary world.  
Social cooperation within large group settings of heterogeneous agents happens all the 
time.18  When history appears to defy what logic dictates, the economists must show why 
it appears that way, and how the logic is actually played out in that situation.  The “how it 
works,” question is answered by explicating the mechanism in operation. 
 Stringham’s (1999, 2002, 2003) work has tended to focus on how through the use 
of “club-like” arrangements, mechanisms of excluding potential bad traders takes place.  
Stringham emphasizes that most of the literature focuses on the potential effectiveness of 
ex post punishment.  But historically, those engaged in the complicated exchange 
relationship would rather avoid any of the costs associated with ex post punishment, they 
would prefer to have ex ante sorting mechanisms that weed out potential bad-faith 
traders.  We do not come into trading relationships with a tattoo on our heads that says 
“trustworthy” or “cheater”, but various institutions have evolved throughout time and 
across historical circumstances that attempt to approximate that.  And the “club-like” 
                                                
18 And often even with actors that have high discount rates, see Leeson’s work on pirate communities 
(2009a) and another example is Skarbek’s (2010) work on prison gangs. 
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arrangements Stringham has studied reveal amazing creativity in efforts at ex ante sorting 
while minimizing the cost of excluding.  Stringham mechanisms tend to transform large-
group settings into more manageable small group settings, and to pre-sort the group so 
that even though the population pool is heterogeneous those who are accepted into the 
club are more or less homogeneous on the character trait that matters for the group.  Self-
enforcement is thus obtained through these ex ante methods of sorting. 
 Leeson’s (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b) work, on the other hand, has tended to focus 
on Mises’s argument concerning social cooperation under the division of labor, and show 
how strangers find mechanisms to become included in the trading community.19  But 
Leeson hasn’t limited his creative energies to situations of how strangers signal their 
trustworthiness to potential trading partners, but his work has spanned over a variety of 
historical circumstances where it would be least likely for the theoretical mechanisms he 
has explicated to work.  In other words, while he started out trying to explain how actors 
overcome geographic and social distance to realize the gains from social cooperation 
under the division of labor, his subsequent studies have touched upon not only the ex ante 
signaling mechanisms (e.g., Leeson 2008) but the role that ex post enforcement 
mechanisms play in producing social order (e.g., 2007 and 2009b). 
 So we have in the recent work of Stringham and Leeson an exploration far beyond 
the original discussions of the Soviet and post-Soviet situation.  They have demonstrated 
                                                
19 In his chapter on “Human Society”, Mises (1949) explains how sympathy, friendship and a sense of 
belonging follow from realizing the great gains from social cooperation under the division of labor.  And he 
stresses the arrow of causation.  It is because specialization and trade increases productivity and wealth that 
humanity can enjoy the fruits of sympathy, friendship and community.  If specialization and exchange did 
not yield great productivity and wealth creation, then mankind would have forever been destined to be 
trapped in a relentless struggle for survival and would view each other as deadly foes competing by 
whatever means to secure a portion of the scarce resources necessary for sustenance provided by nature.  
He would be in constant conflict with any other creature he encountered.  It is this caricature of the human 
condition (more than the absence of a sovereign as Hobbes postulated) that would produce a life for man 
that was “nasty, brutish and short.” 
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that complicated exchange relationships have emerged and developed in the absence of 
any geographic monopoly of formal law and order.  Sometimes the rules of the game in 
the historical examples they examine are implicit and enforced by the social sanction of 
ostracism exclusively, but in many instances they have identified explicit rules and 
elaborate enforcements as a penalty for violating the rules.  In all the cases, the 
endogenous rules they have identified serve to allow individuals in those situations to 
realize the gains from social cooperation under the division of labor. 
 There remains much work to be done. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The Austrian school of economics from its founding has emphasized the logic of human 
action, and the spontaneous order of the market.  Contributors to that tradition such as 
Menger and Hayek, have also explained how the framework institutions of morals, 
money and law are examples of institutions that arise not from the brow of a genius, but 
as the by-product of individuals striving to better their condition in the world and in so 
doing seeking out the gains from social cooperation.  Morals, money, and law, as well as 
the market economy itself, are prime examples of institutions that are “the result of 
human action, but not of human design.”  But note something of importance --- morals, 
money, and law are framework institutions, the market economy operates within that 
framework.  In short, from Menger as well as Hayek we learn that the most important 
questions in the sciences of man concern the mechanisms by which the spontaneous 
evolution of the framework is established, as well as the spontaneous order of the market 
that exists inside of that framework. 
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 The positive political economy of anarchism follows as a research program 
naturally from this emphasis on spontaneous order one finds in the Austrian school.  We 
cannot treat institutions as given, and we cannot treat state governmental capacity as 
either easily established or benign in operation.  As a result, the research program of 
positive political economy of anarchism is empirical and possesses contemporary 
relevance. 
 That contemporary relevance is not limited to the post-communist, developing 
countries or after-war reconstruction situations.  Instead, the contemporary relevance can 
be seen in the contemporary efforts to escape the state provision of public goods in 
schooling and health, in the rise of private communities, and in the persistence of various 
private dispute resolution mechanisms and even the growing market share of private 
security forces.  And, perhaps most relevant for the young scholars in attendance – the 
relevance of research on anarchism is not tied to the normative anarchist theory that has 
had some connection to the Austrian school (whatever your judgment is on that work) but 
can address what the Economist recently referred to as “the great political issue of our 
times.”20 And that ‘issue of our times’ is the fiscal crisis that has spread through the 
western world and the need to reign in the growth of the state and tame Leviathan.  Such 
exercises require a rethinking of the scale and scope of government.  In the process of 
such rethinking, we can explore the old classical liberal wisdom that we must limit the 
scope of government to those things, and only those things, that is does well, and leave to 
the market and to civil society those things the government cannot do well.  The answer 
to that question is up for the next generation to answer.  The answer provided by your 
                                                
20 See the March 19th 2011 edition of The Economist and the special issue on “Taming Leviathan”. 
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ancestors was wrong, and the answer provided by my generation has proven wrong, it is 
time for your generation to get it right.  As the Economist reports, the Chinese policy 
maker Ma Hong recently argued that “We are in a transition from a big state to a small 
state, and from a small society to a big society.”  As we turn more and more to civil 
society and the market economy to substitute for the state, the mechanisms in operation 
that permit individuals to realize the gains from social cooperation under the division of 
labor will need to be continually explicated in our research and communicated in your 
writing and lecturing.  Austrian economics is a progressive research program in economic 
science, and the positive political economy of anarchism is perhaps its best testing ground 
to prove its worth against the competitive research paradigms in modern economics and 
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